diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch | 73 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 73 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 91627fb..0000000 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit - and Confirm - -The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not -checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read -overflow when processing an invalid message. - -Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before -processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to -make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm -message before the previous exchanges have been completed. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index f2b0926..a629437 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - u16 offset; - u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; -+ -+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } - - if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || -@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* - * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | - * prf --- -1.9.1 - |