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Diffstat (limited to 'target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch')
-rw-r--r--target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch27
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c0c223..0000000
--- a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
-Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000
-Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
-
-Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
-with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
-sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
-condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
-doors for a privilege escalation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
-Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
---- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
-+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
-@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk
- if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
- return -EINVAL;
-
-+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
- hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
- if (hndl == NULL)
- err = -ENOENT;