diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch | 27 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch b/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6c0c223..0000000 --- a/target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> -Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000 -Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[] - -Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY -with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of -sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this -condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening -doors for a privilege escalation. - -Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> -Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> ---- ---- a/net/core/sock_diag.c -+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c -@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk - if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) - return -EINVAL; - -+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ - hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); - if (hndl == NULL) - err = -ENOENT; |